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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of competition among firms on their decisions about the
pre-committed production (sales capacities), sales quantities, and product disposal in a
duopoly model with demand uncertainty. A complete set of parameter configurations
with which one of the following three cases emerges is identified: (i) neither capacity
expansion nor product disposal occurring regardless of demand realization; (ii) only ca-
pacity expansion occurring when high demand is realized; and (iii) only product disposal
occurring when low demand is realized. The flexibility in capacity constraints reduces
the likelihood of product disposal. Duopolistic competition increases the likelihood that
either capacity expansion or product disposal occurs. This tendency is enhanced as the
two goods are better substitutes. In addition, duopolistic competition leads to either
higher or lower disposal intensities (product disposal per output) depending on the
relative size of demand variability to production costs.
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1 Introduction
Societies have generally become more aware of resource scarcity and production and con-
sumption inefficiency. For example, many have criticized the regular disposal of unsold
merchandise, such as food and clothing (“green criticism”).1 One luxury fashion brand
faced fierce criticism after revealing that it scrapped many valuable unsold clothes and cos-
metics.2 Such a business practice, which is not exclusive to luxury products, has prevailed
in many sectors. As an example that recently became famous in Japan is the “Ehomaki”
sushi roll, which is consumed to celebrate the beginning of spring; it became an iconic target
of criticism against product disposal because many unsold rolls are wasted every year.3
Perhaps the practice of discarding unsold products is unavoidable (or even rational) to
some degree, however, since such products tend to be short-lived (e.g., perishable goods
tend to expire quickly) and face demand uncertainty for which it is difficult to prepare
precise amounts of products in advance. These factors may at least partially explain why
firms regularly dispose of large amounts of unsold merchandise. The following questions still
remain unanswered, however: Under what circumstances is product disposal unavoidable?
Do firms dispose of unsold products too much (as criticized)? If product disposal generates
inefficiency, what policy interventions can fix it?
This paper examines these positive and normative questions and attempts to evaluate
the efficiency of this business practice from the point of view of economic welfare. An
often-mentioned justification for product disposal is suggestive for choosing an analytical
framework: product disposal is done for preventing unsold items being stolen and sold
cheaply elsewhere, which may damage their intellectual property and brand value.4 This
anecdotal justification clearly suggests that products destroyed in case of unsold are more
or less differentiated and have some market power. Following Maggi (1996), the present
paper proposes a two-stage duopoly model with not-perfectly rigid capacity constraints:
Two firms producing differentiated goods first set their production capacities and then
compete in price. I extend the Maggi’s model in two respects. First, by introducing demand
1For example, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) advocated by the United Nations in 2015
propose substantial reductions in food waste and losses in their twelfth goal such that “(b)y 2030, halve
per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and
supply chains, including post-harvest losses.”
2Elizabeth Paton, “Burberry to Stop Burning Clothing and Other Goods It Can’t Sell,” The New York
Times Sep. 6, 2018.
3Noriko Okada, “Ehomaki sushi rolls spark controbersy,” NHK World-Japan Feb. 4, 2019.
4Morwenna Ferrier, “Why does Burberry destroy its products and how is it justified?,” The Guardian
Jul. 20, 2018.
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uncertainty, the two firms have to set their sales capacities before demand uncertainty is
resolved. At the next stage, given information about each other’s capacity and precise
market size, they compete in price and determine sales quantities. Second, ex post capacity
adjustment can be two directions, while the Maggi’s model allows only ex post additional
production. Facing the realization of high demand, the firms may expand the sales capacity
through second-stage production, which is more costly than the first-stage capacity-building
production. In addition, if low demand is realized, they may choose not to sell their entire
capacities and scrap unsold capacity with incurring disposal costs, which is product disposal
in the present model. Although the present model is highly stylized, it can be analytically
solvable and describe all sets of equilibria.
Although the paper’s goal is to examine the effect of competition among firms on their
decisions about the pre-committed production (sales capacities), sales quantities, and prod-
uct disposal, the analysis begins with a monopoly case. The monopoly setting completely
abstracts firms’ strategic behavior from the model, but is useful to understand the intuition
of product disposal and a complete set of parameter configurations with which one of the
following three cases emerges: (i) neither capacity expansion nor product disposal (capac-
ity destruction) occurring regardless of demand realization; (ii) only capacity expansion
occurring when high demand is realized; and (iii) only product disposal occurring when
low demand is realized. We then proceed to the duopoly case. Our main findings are as
follows. First, product disposal occurs if the sum of the unit disposal and the initial-stage
production costs is sufficiently lower than demand variability and the net marginal cost of
the second-stage production in excess of the sales capacity. Thus, capacity flexibility con-
straints substantially reduce product disposal even though flexibility is just one direction
(only capacity expansion). Second, regarding the ratio of product disposal to capacity con-
straints (disposal intensity), the monopolist does not yield any inefficiency associated with
product disposal, which implies that by fixing standard production distortion by monopoly,
the social planner actually increases product disposal. Third, in the duopoly case, we show
that a Bertrand equilibrium emerges when product disposal occurs, which contribute to
increasing disposal intensity. This tendency is more pronounced as the degree of product
differentiation decreases.
The oligopoly model with pre-committed capacity constraints has long been studied.
Among others, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that price competition with capacity
constraints yields Cournot outcomes under some conditions. However, Maggi (1996) shows
that relaxing the assumption about perfectly rigid capacity constraints and introducing
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product differentiation (a standard way to avert the Bertrand paradox) allow competition
equilibria to range from Bertrand to the Cournot depending on the degree of rigidity of ca-
pacity constraints.5 Mine is a variant of the Maggi model but departs from it by introducing
stochastic demand, which enables capacity expansion and product disposal to emerge. In
contrast, without demand uncertainty, Maggi (1996) demonstrates that firms always sell
their entire sales capacities at equilibrium regardless of their competition modes. Staiger
and Wolak (1992) study demand uncertainty in an oligopoly setting with strictly rigid ca-
pacity constraints; however, their interest is firms’ collusive behavior and its sustainability
in a repeated game context. This paper’s interest is completely different, examining
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model’s
setup. Section 3 solves the model in a monopoly setting. We also conduct welfare analysis by
considering the social planner’s problem. Section 4 examines how the model’s implications
are altered from the monopoly case by introducing two symmetric firms competing in price.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy with two sectors: sector 0 provides a homogenous good (good 0) while
sector 1 horizontally differentiated goods. While sector 0 is perfectly competitive, sector 1
is oligopolistic. For analytical simplicity, I assume only two symmetric risk-neutral firms in
sector 1. A representative consumer has quasi-linear utilities of the form U = q0 + u(q),
where q0 is consumption of good 0 and q is the vector of consumption of sector 1 goods.
The sub-utility u(q) takes a form that yields the following linear demand for firm i’s good:
qi = a− pi + bpj, b ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where i, j = {1, 2} and i 6= j. As is standard, assuming that the economy’s population is
large enough for some workers to be employed in sector 0, this sector absorbs all income
effects.
I introduce demand uncertainty for sector 1. Parameter a is assumed to be stochastic:
It takes two states, “high” and “low”, such that aH = a¯+ µ and aL = a¯− µ, where µ > 0
is the deviation from the center value a¯. Assuming each state may occur evenly, a¯ is also
the mean value of a and µ is the standard deviation of a.
5In addition, Maggi (1996) shows that only unique pure strategy equilibrium exists, unlike Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) in which mixed-strategy equilibria may emerge.
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2.2 Production and Sales
All goods are produced with constant returns to scale technologies from labor only. Good
0 serves as the numeraire good in the model, and the competitive wage equals the marginal
product of labor in good 0. Units are chosen such that the wage equals 1, which prevails
across the economy assuming the free mobility of labor.
Supplying good 1 to the market is assumed to have two stages. In the first stage,
risk-neutral firms produce good 1 at constant marginal cost c, and its true demand is
unknown to them, so they must determine the output level only with the knowledge about
the distribution of demand levels.
In the second stage, the true value of a and each firm’s stock level of good 1 (sales
capacity) become known to all firms. Firms sell good 1, incurring cs for each unit of sales.
Following Maggi (1996), I assume that the firms can expand their sales capacities in the
second stage by paying constant marginal cost ce, which is no less than c (i.e., c ≤ ce).
Furthermore, the firms may not sell all the goods produced in the first stage and must
scrap these unsold units of good 1, incurring unit disposal cost cd.
These capacity expansion and capacity destruction (product disposal) not only reflect
the real world (e.g., overtime work and spot procurement from outside the firm as capacity
expansion and disposal of unsold merchandise as capacity destruction) but also defines the
sales capacity constraint flexibility set in the first stage, which may also characterizes goods
or industries. For instance, products required to use highly specialized inputs can have high
ce while those do not contain toxic chemical materials, like food and garments, may have
low cd. The second-stage production and disposal costs control the rigidity of sales capacity
constraints and influence firms’ strategies with respect to production and sales.
3 A Preliminary Examination
To understand the fundamentals of product disposal, I start with the monopoly case to
abstract the effect of strategic interactions among firms. In the case of monopoly, the
product demand can be simplified to q = a − p. As is standard, the model is solved by
backward induction.
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3.1 The Second Stage
In the second stage, the monopolistic firm determines the sales quantity, given the output
level of good 1 at k. The marginal sales cost (MSC) depends on sales quantity:
MSC =


cs − cd for q < k
cs for q = k
cs + ce for q > k.
As long as the sales is not bounded to the first-stage production of k and product disposal
occurs, increasing sales by one unit saves the unit disposal cost. Thus, the MSC is cs − cd.
When sales quantity simply equals sales capacity, product disposal does not occur and the
MSC is cs. Once sales quantity surpasses k, the MSC becomes cs + ce.
The combination of sales capacity constraints and demand shocks leads to several pro-
duction and sales plans. However, the following three plans can immediately be excluded:
(i) product disposal in high demand, (ii) sales-capacity addition in low demand, and (iii)
product disposal in low demand and sales-capacity addition in high demand. The first two
cases are straightforward. Both production and disposal are costly, and additional produc-
tion after demand shocks are observed is costlier than the sales-capacity building in the first
stage. Thus, the firm never chooses sales capacity associated with product disposal in high
demand or product addition in low demand. The third exclusion may be somewhat elusive,
however, for the following reason. Suppose that sales capacity set in the first stage is not
binding in both demand states. Then, while a unit increase in sales capacity would raise the
ex post profit in high demand by ce to save product addition by one unit, it would reduce the
ex post profit in low demand by cd by generating a unit product disposal. Thus, if ce > cd,
the firm chooses sales capacity that does not require additional production in high demand.
If ce < cd, the opposite is true. Therefore, in what follows, I will examine conditions that
enable one of the following three cases: (i) neither product disposal nor product addition
occurs, (ii) sales capacity expanding in high demand, and (iii) unsold goods being discarded
in low demand.
No Disposal and No Additional Production (NN)
Letting k denote the sales capacity set in the first stage, the profit in each demand state is
expressed by
pis(k) = k(as − k − cs), s = {H,L}.
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For product disposal not to occur, the marginal revenue in the low-demand state evaluated
at k needs to be greater than MSC:
aL − 2k ≥ cs − cd. (2)
Likewise, for product addition (capacity expansion) not to occur, the marginal revenue in
high demand evaluated at k is no greater than MSC:
aH − 2k ≤ cs + ce. (3)
Both no-disposal and no-expansion conditions suggest that demand variability µ cannot be
too large.
No Disposal and Additional Production (NA)
The profit in low demand takes the same form as the NN case: piL(k) = k(aL − k − cs).
Given high demand, the firm sets the sales quantity by maximizing
max
q
q [aH − q − (cs + ce)] + cek,
which leads to the sales quantity and profit in high demand such that
qH =
aH − (cs + ce)
2
, piH(k) =
1
4
[aH − (cs + ce)]
2 + cek.
The profit linearly increases as the first-stage capacity k increases, which implies that in-
creases in the sales capacity reduces costly additional production in the second stage.
The condition for no disposal is the same as (2). The condition for additional production
to occur is the complement set of (3):
aH − 2k > cs + ce. (4)
Disposal and No Additional Production (DN)
This is a mirror image of the NA case. Sales quantity in high demand equals the sales
capacity, k, and the profit is piH(k) = k(aH − k− cs). The firm determine sales quantity in
low demand by solving
max
q
q [aL − q − (cs − cd)]− cdk,
which leads to the sales and profit in low demand such that
qL =
aL − (cs − cd)
2
, piL(k) =
1
4
[aL − (cs − cd)]
2 − cdk.
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Each unit of increasing first-stage production reduces the profit by cd due to increasing
product disposal.
For production disposal to occur, we need the following condition:
aL − 2k < cs − cd, (5)
which is the complement set of (2). The condition for excluding additional production in
the second stage is the same as (3).
3.2 The First Stage
In the first stage, the firm sets its sales capacity, k, to maximize the expected profits. In
the NN case, profit maximization is
max
k
1
2
k(aL − k − cs) +
1
2
k(aH − k − cs)− ck ⇔ max
k
k(a¯− k − cs − c).
Hence, the firm optimizes k using information about the average demand size, the unit sales
cost, and the unit cost for first-stage production. The first-order condition (FOC) gives the
optimal sales capacity that the firm does not alter in the second stage:
kn =
a¯− (c+ cs)
2
.
Substituting kn into (2), the condition for no disposal is as follows.
cd + c ≥ µ. (6)
Note that cd + c is interpreted as the total unit cost for product disposal (we may refer to
it as the “long-run” unit cost for product disposal because c and cd occur in the fist and
second-stages, respectively).6 When the long-run disposal cost surpasses the size of demand
fluctuations, the firm would avoid product disposal.
The condition for no additional production in (3) turns to be
ce − c ≥ µ. (7)
This condition is also intuitive. The net cost for capacity expansion in the second stage
is ce − c since if the firm instead produces that margin in the first stage, it would cost
c. In this sense, ce − c represents the “long-run” unit cost for capacity expansion, and
condition (7) states that when the “long-run” capacity expansion cost is greater than the
6Of course, the immediate or “the short-run” marginal cost for dumping unsold output is cd.
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size of demand fluctuations, the firm would never expand its sales capacity even after high
demand is observed.
In the capacity-expansion case (the NA case), profit maximization is given by
max
k
1
2
k(aL − k − cs) +
1
8
[aH − (cs + ce)]
2 +
ce
2
k − ck.
The FOC gives the optimal sales capacity such that
ka =
aL − (2c+ cs − ce)
2
.
Substituting this result into (4), the condition for additional production is
ce − c < µ, (8)
which is the complement set of (7). The no-disposal condition is derived by substituting
kNA into (2):
cd + c ≥ ce − c. (9)
I now turn to the disposal case (the DN case). The first-stage optimization is formulated
as follows.
max
k
1
8
[aL − (cs − cd)]
2 −
cd
2
k +
1
2
k(aH − k − cs)− ck.
The FOC gives the optimal sales capacity such that
kd =
aH − (2c + cs + cd)
2
.
Applying this result to (5), the condition for disposal to occur is given by
cd + c < µ. (10)
Substituting kDN into (3), the condition for additional production not to occur is
cd + c < ce − c, (11)
which is the complement set of (9).
Figure 1 presents the parameter configurations that determine the optimal production-
and-sales strategy in a (cd+c, ce−c) plane. Only when both long-run disposal and additional
production costs are greater than the standard deviation of demand, µ, neither product dis-
posal nor capacity expansion occurs. Otherwise, the firm exerts either production disposal
or additional production to adjust demand fluctuations. For product disposal to be chosen
as the optimal strategy, the long-run disposal cost has to be lower than the standard devi-
ation of demand and the long-run marginal cost for capacity expansion. I summarize these
findings in the following proposition.
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cd + c
ce − c
µ
µ
NN
NA
DN
Figure 1: The Configuration of Production and Disposal
Proposition 1. In a monopoly economy in which sales capacity must be set before demand
uncertainty is resolved (the first stage) and costly sales capacity expansion is feasible after
demand uncertainty is resolved (the second stage), product disposal occurs only when the
sum of the marginal disposal cost and the marginal cost for first-stage production is lower
than (i) the standard deviation of variable demand and (ii) the net marginal cost for the
second stage production in excess of the sales capacity.
Interestingly, second-stage production makes the condition for product disposal more
stringent. To see this, suppose that the second-stage production is infeasible (sales capacity
constraints are perfectly rigid). Then, the condition of cd+ c < µ is necessary and sufficient
for product disposal to occur. However, once the second-stage production becomes available
and the long-run marginal cost for the second-stage production, ce − c, is lower than the
long-run unit disposal cost, cd + c, the firm is willing to adjust demand fluctuations by
capacity expansion rather than product disposal; product disposal would not occur under
such a parameter configuration. Figure 1 indicates the parameter range in which second-
stage production makes product disposal less profitable by a colored triangle area. The
following proposition captures this finding.
Proposition 2. As the production cost in the second-stage declines, the sales capacity
constraints set in the first-stage loosen. As a result, the firm will choose a smaller sales
capacity in the first-stage and as a result, the possibility of product disposal reduces.
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Table 1: Summary Results: Monopoly Case
Sales capacity Sales quantity Expected profits
NN kn =
a¯−(c+cs)
2
qnH = qnL = kn p¯in = k
2
n
NA ka =
aL−(2c+cs−ce)
2
qaH =
aH−(cs+ce)
2 p¯ia =
q2aH+k
2
a
2qaL = ka
DN kd =
aH−(2c+cs+cd)
2
qdH = kd
p¯id =
q2
dL
+k2
d
2
qdL =
aL−(cs−cd)
2
Table 1 summarizes the optimized sales capacity (first-stage production), sales in the
second-stage, and profits.
3.3 Production Disposal and Social Welfare
This section focuses on the case that the firm selects the disposal strategy (the DN case)
and examines both positive and normative aspects of the disposal strategy. The amount of
product disposal is given by D ≡ kd − qdL, where qdL is the sales quantity in low demand.
Simple algebra leads to
Dm = µ− (cd + c). (12)
We, then, define the disposal intensity as the ratio of disposal to sales capacity (output in
the first-stage):
DIm ≡
2µ − 2(cd + c)
a¯+ µ− (cs + cd + 2c)
.
The effects of the model’s key parameters on disposal intensity are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, as average market size increases (a¯ ↑), production cost in-
creases (c ↑), and as disposal cost increases (cd ↑), disposal intensity decreases. In contrast,
more variable demand (µ ↑) and higher sales cost (cs ↑) both raise disposal intensity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
All these results are intuitive. Product disposal depends only on demand variability and
long-run disposal cost. An increase in the average demand size raises the sales capacity and
lowers disposal intensity. Sales cost increases similarly work but in the opposite direction.
An increase in the disposal cost urges the firm to decrease the sales capacity and increase
the sales in the low state. As a result, disposal intensity decreases. An increase in first-stage
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production cost lowers sales capacity, but does not affect sales quantity in the low state.
Disposal intensity decreases. Finally, as demand becomes more variable, sales amount in
low demand falls whereas the firm increases its sales capacity because it also cares about
high demand. Consequently, disposal intensity increases.
The effect of demand variability on firm behavior is interesting. The firm’s expected
profit is expressed by
p¯id =
k2d + q
2
dL
2
, (13)
which increases as the standard deviation of demand fluctuations increases (see the Ap-
pendix). Hence, the risk-neutral firm strictly prefers demand uncertainty when optimally
choosing the sales capacity at which product disposal may occur. We record this point as
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the firm optimally chooses the sales capacity that yields prod-
uct disposal in the case of demand shortage. If the demand becomes more volatile in the
manner of mean-preserving spread, then, the firm’s average profit increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Perhaps surprisingly, increasing demand uncertainty and the concomitantly increasing
product disposal can result in even higher consumer surplus if consumers are risk-neutral
because the welfare gain from increasing supply in the high-demand state always overweighs
the welfare loss due to shrinking supply in the low-demand state. Along with Proposition
4, we conclude that as demand uncertainty increases in a mean-preserving spread manner,
social welfare (defined as the sum of the firm’s profit and consumer surplus) improves
when the firm optimally chooses a product disposal strategy. This result is recorded in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that all economic agents are risk-neutral and the firm optimally
chooses a sales capacity that generates product disposal in the case of demand shortage.
If demand becomes more volatile in the manner of mean-preserving spread, then product
disposal increases and, on average, social welfare increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3.4 Policy Intervention and Efficiency
To what extent does the monopolist that optimally chooses a disposal strategy distort
efficiency? To answer this question, we replace the monopolist with the social planner (the
government) as a maximizer of expected social welfare. To avoid unnecessary redundancy,
the parameter configurations that determine which of the three strategies (NN, NA, and
DN) is chosen are the same as in the monopolist case. With this in mind, I focus on the
product disposal case (DN).
Consider the second stage after low demand is observed. For a given sales capacity k,
the social planner maximizes
max
qL
(aL − qL)qL − (cs − cd)qL − cdk +
q2L
2
,
where the last term is consumer surplus. As is standard, this maximization problem leads
to the marginal cost pricing pL = cs − cd and qL = aL − cs + cd. Hence, the social welfare
in the low-demand state is given by
WL(k) =
(aL − cs + cd)
2
2
− cdk.
When high demand is observed, k is binding and the social planner’s pricing is pH = aH−k,
as in the monopolist case. The social welfare in the high-demand state is
WH(k) = k(aH − k − cs) +
k2
2
.
In the first stage, the social planner chooses k to maximize the expected social welfare:
max
k
W¯ (k) = max
k
1
2
[WL(k) +WH(k)]− ck,
leading to the socially optimal sales capacity k∗D as follows:
k∗DN = aH − (cs + cd + 2c).
The amount of disposal and disposal intensity are given by
d∗ = 2 [µ− (cd + c)] and DI
∗ =
2µ− 2(cd + c)
a¯+ µ− (cs + cd + 2c)
,
respectively. Hence, the social planner chooses the exactly the same disposal intensity as the
monopolistic firm. The social planner can fix the monopolist’s output distortion, doubling
the supply of good 1 (as is standard). However, with the same disposal intensity, the social
planner proportionally increases product disposal. The monopoly power itself, then, does
not distort product disposal. We record this finding in the following proposition.
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Proposition 6. The social planner’s ex ante choice of disposal intensity, defined by the
ratio of product disposal to sales capacity is the same as the monopolist’s choice. The
monopolist’s disposal intensity is thus socially optimal.
From Proposition 6, we derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Any ex ante taxes and subsidies that affect the disposal intensity worsens
social welfare on average.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 states that product-disposal reductions by policy intervention before demand
uncertainty is resolved (ex ante policy intervention) are incompatible with social-welfare
maximization. However, since unsold merchandize is discarded in low demand, one may
think that ex post policy interventions (e.g. product disposal taxes or sales subsidies) may
increase sales quantity, resulting in less product disposal and higher social welfare. However,
such policies generally cannot avoid the time-inconsistency problem: if the firm correctly
expect policy interventions when low demand is realized, it is highly likely to change the
first-stage capacity setting.
4 Duopoly
We now proceed to a duopoly model with two symmetric firms facing the demand in (1).
Unlike the monopoly case, the choice of competition mode–Bertrand (price) or Cournot
(quantity) competition–matters. The present model is a variant of the oligopoly model with
capacity constraints, and in this respect, I relay heavily on Maggi (1996) in which either
Bertrand or Cournot competition is endogenously determined depending on the rigidity of
pre-committed capacities. However, in Maggi (1996), predetermined capacity constraints
are always binding at equilibrium because product demand is deterministic. In contrast,
the present model frees capacity constraints from always being binding by incorporating
stochastic demand, enabling product disposal and capacity expansion.
4.1 Second-Stage Subgame
As in the monopolist case, we start with the subgame in the second stage. Regardless of
the realized demand state, if capacity constraints are not binding (either due to capacity
expansion or product disposal), Bertrand (price) competition emerges. By contrast, if each
14
pj
pi
pj(1) pj(2) pj(3)
ri(pj |cs + ce)
ri(pj |cs − cd)
Φ(pj|ki)
Figure 2: Firm i’s Best Response
firm sells its entire predetermined capacity at the market-clearing price, the second-stage
competition mode is essentially Cournot, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) point out.
In general, for firm i’s profit of pii = (pi − x)qi, where x is the cost of generating one
unit of sales, firm i’s reaction function in Bertrand competition is defined by rbi (pj |x) ≡
argmaxpi pii. Using the demand function in (1), the explicit form is given by r
b
i (pj |x) =
(a+ bpj +x)/2.
7 This Bertrand reaction function holds when firms either expands capacity
or dispose of products. To clarify this point, firm i’s capacity-expansion optimization in the
second stage is maxpi [pi − (cs + ce)]qi + ceki and its product disposal is maxpi [pi − (cs −
cd)]qi − cdki. In both optimization, the pre-committed capacity ki does not affect firm i’s
best-reaction prices.
If the firm neither expands capacity nor disposes of products, it sells precisely its entire
capacity. Hence, the price-setting subgame is reduced to a capacity-setting fist-stage game
so that Cournot competition emerges (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). We can define price
combinations that exactly satisfy firm i’s capacity constraints set in the first stage by
pi ≡ Φi(pj|ki) (status quo prices). The explicit form of this “status quo” curve is given by
Φi(pj|ki) = a− ki + bpj.
How does firm i react to the rival firms’ price pj? Figure 2 illustrates two Bertrand
reaction functions, rbi (pj |cs + ce) and r
b
i (pj|cs − cd), and the status quo curve Φ(pj|ki) for
7I omit the subscripts s = {H,L} for the demand states since discussion here is commonly applicable to
both demand states. I will reintroduce the subscripts when I discuss the full-game.
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given ki in a (pj , pi) plane. It is easy to verify that 0 < ∂r
b
i/∂pj < ∂Φi/∂pj < 1.
8 Relegating
rigorous exposition to the Appendix, I here present the intuition about firms i’s reaction.
When the rival price pj is low (pj(1)), the residual demand for firm i is low. Thus, firm i’s
best response is the Bertrand reaction price ri(pj |cs − cd), which is above the status quo
price Φi(pj |ki) so that product disposal occurs. When the residual demand is small, firm i’s
rational behavior is selling only a part of its capacity and maintaining a high price rather
than selling up to capacity at a low price. When the rival price falls in the middle rage pj(2),
firm i’s demand is relatively large. Hence, the best response is selling the entire capacity at
the market-clearing price Φ(pj|ki). Finally, if the rival price pj is high (pj(3)), the residual
demand is large enough for firm i to expand its sales capacity. The best response coincides
with the Bertrand reaction price ri(pj |cs + ce).
In summary, firm i’s reaction curve in the second-stage subgame, Ri(pj |ki), is as follows:
Ri(pj |ki) =


rbi (pj |cs − cd) for pj <
2ki−a+(cs−cd)
b
Φi(pj |ki) for
2ki−a+(cs−cd)
b
≤ pj ≤
2ki−a+cs+ce
b
rbi (pj |cs + ce) for pj >
2ki−a+cs+ce
b
,
which is depicted as the bold line in Figure 2. Firm i’s best-response price to pj monotoni-
cally increases and always has a slope less than 1. Firm j’s best response to pi is symmetry
around a 45 degree line. Hence, the two best reaction functions necessarily intersect only
once: The second-stage subgame has a unique equilibrium with a pure strategy for each
demand state.
4.2 Capacity-setting Game: Status Quo
Given these subgame reaction functions, I move to first-stage capacity setting. As in the
monopolist case, the three cases of NN, NA, and DN exhaust all possible equilibria in the
duopoly. First, the subgame best-response functions intersect at the segment in which both
pre-committed ki and kj are binding in both demand states (pj(2) in Figure 2). Neither
capacity expansion nor product disposal occurs (NN). Since neither firms alter its capacities
in the second stage, optimization is reduced to a capacity-choice problem in the first-stage:
max
ki
1
2
(piL − cs)ki +
1
2
(piH − cs)ki − cki,
⇔max
ki
[E(pi)− (c+ cs)] ki,
8To illustrate Figure 2, I assume that the second-stage parameters are configured such that the Bertrand
reaction functions intersect with the status quo curve for non-negative pj , namely, ki > (a − x)/2. This is
just made for explanatory convenience.
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where E(pi) ≡ (piL + piH)/2 = a¯/(1 − b) − ki/(1 − b
2) − bkj/(1 − b
2) is the average price.
Firm i’s optimal capacity choice is given by
ki(kj) =
1
2
[
(1 + b)a¯− (1− b2)(c + cs)− bkj
]
,
which leads to the sales capacity in symmetric equilibrium such that
kn =
(1 + b)[a¯− (1− b)(c+ cs)]
2 + b
. (14)
The equilibrium price in each state is pns = (as − kn)/(1 − b) for s = {H,L}. The firms
respond to demand fluctuations by adjusting market-clearing prices.
Under what conditions is the equilibrium of the NN case sustainable? The firms’ sales
capacities are binding in both demand states, so deviations from the equilibrium price in
the high-demand state need to be price-cutting by capacity expansion. Likewise, when the
low-demand state realizes, possible deviations from the equilibrium price are price-raising
by product disposal. The condition for no-expansion is that, given that the rival firm stays
on kn, firm i’s marginal revenue from capacity expansion evaluated at kn is no greater than
the marginal cost for capacity expansion cs+ce in the high-demand state. Using kn in (14),
the explicit form of this condition is given by
ce − c ≥
µ
1− b
. (15)
In a similar vein, deviations from the equilibrium price in the low-demand state in order for
disposal not to occur, firm i’s marginal revenue evaluated at kn is no less than the marginal
cost for product disposal cs − cd:
cd + c ≥
µ
1− b
. (16)
These no-deviaition conditions are more stringent than the counterpart conditions in the
monopoly case (see (6) and (7)). When the two products are independent, i.e. b = 0, (15)
and (16) are identical to the non-deviation conditions in monopoly, and as the two goods
become more substitutable (b ↑), either capacity expansion or product disposal is more
likely to occur. Intuitively, in duopoly, each firm attempts to steal rents from the rival firm
by capacity expansion with price-cutting in high demand or product disposal with price-
raising in low demand. The more substitutable the two goods become (b ↑), the easier the
rent sealing is. Thus, the NN case is less sustainable in duopoly than in monopoly. This
result is recorded in the following proposition.
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Proposition 7. Capacity expansion in the high-demand state and product disposal in the
low-demand state are more likely to emerge in duopoly than in monopoly. This tendency
increases in less-differentiated products.
4.3 Capacity Expansion
Next, the subgame best-response functions in the high-demand state intersect at the seg-
ment in which both firms expand their sales capacity (pj(3) in Figure 2). The pre-committed
capacities must be binding in the low-demand state (pj(2) in Figure 2) for the follow-
ing reason. Suppose not. Then, the second stage profit-maximization in the low state is
written by either capacity expansion (maxpi [pi − (cs + ce)]qi + ceki) or product disposal
(maxpi [pi− (cs− cd)]qi− cdki). In case of capacity expansion, the firm can raise the second-
stage profits by increasing capacity without altering the equilibrium price. The firm contin-
ues to increase its capacity until no room exists for capacity expansion, which contradicts
with non-biding capacity in the low state. In case of product disposal, the firm can raise
the second-stage profits by cutting capacity. However, this necessarily reduces profit in the
high state. Thus, if profit gains in the low state overweighs profit loss in the high state, the
firm continues to cut its capacity until capacity constraints are binding in the high state,
which contradicts with capacity expansion in the high state. If profit gains in the low state
is overweighed by profit loss in the high state, the firm must increase initial capacity and
product disposal disappears, which is also contradiction. Hence, when the firm expands
capacity in the high-demand state, its pre-committed capacity must be binding when the
low-demand state is realized.
The maximized profit in the high-demand state is expressed by piaH(ki) = (qaH)
2+ceka,
where qaH is the Bertrand sales quantity such that
qaH =
aH − (1− b)(cs + ce)
2− b
.
The Bertrand price is given by
pbaH =
aH + (cs + ce)
2− b
.
When low demand is realized, the sales capacity is binding, so capacity-choice optimization
in the first stage is
max
ki
1
2
(piL − cs)ki − cki +
piaH(ki)
2
⇔ max
ki
[piL − (2c+ cs − ce)]ki,
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which gives firm i’s reaction function such that
ki(kj) =
1
2
[
(1 + b)aL − (1− b
2)(2c + cs − ce)− bkj
]
.
The sales capacity in symmetric equilibrium is
ka =
(1 + b)[aL − (1− b)(2c + cs − ce)]
2 + b
.
The Cournot price in the low state is given by
paL =
aL + (1− b
2)(2c+ cs − ce)
(1− b)(2 + b)
.
For capacity expansion to occur, the marginal revenue from capacity expansion in the
high-demand state evaluated at ka is greater than the marginal cost in capacity expansion
cs+ce. It is easy to verify that this condition is the complement set of (15): ce−c ≤ µ/(1−b)
(see the Appendix). Likewise, for product disposal not to occur, the marginal revenue from
product disposal evaluated at ka needs to be greater than the marginal cost in product
disposal cs − cd. This no-disposal condition is derived as ce − c < cd + c, which is the same
as in the monopoly case.
4.4 Product Disposal
Finally, the subgame best-response functions in the high state intersect at the segment in
which both firms are capacity constrained (pj(2) in Figure 2) while they intersect at the
segment of pj(1) in the low state. The reason for the capacity-constrained firms in high
demand is analogous to that for capacity constrained-firms in low demand in the NA case.
The second-stage equilibrium price in the low state is independent from the pre-committed
capacity in case of product disposal. Thus, if capacity expansion occurred in the high state,
the firm could monotonically increase profits in both states by expanding its capacity in
the first-stage. Product expansion cannot occur. Product disposal in the high state also
yields room for profit gains by capacity cutting in the first stage. Hence, the pre-committed
capacity must be binding in the high state.
The maximized profit in the low-demand state is given by pidL(ki) = (qdL)
2−cdki, where
qdL is the Bertrand sales quantity such that
qdL =
aL − (1− b)(cs − cd)
2− b
. (17)
The Bertrand price is given by
pdL =
aL + (cs − cd)
2− b
.
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The pre-committed capacities are binding in the high-demand state, so capacity-choice
optimization in the first stage is
max
ki
1
2
(piH − cs)ki − cki +
pidL(ki)
2
⇔ max
ki
[piH − (2c+ cs + cd)]ki.
Firm i’s reaction functions is
ki(kj) =
1
2
[(1 + b)aH − (1− b
2)(2c+ cs + cd)− bkj ],
and the sales capacity in symmetric equilibrium, thus, is given by
kd =
(1 + b)[aH − (1− b)(2c + cs + cd)]
2 + b
. (18)
The Cournot price in the high state is given by
pdH =
aH + (1− b
2)(2c+ cs + cd)
(1− b)(2 + b)
.
For product disposal to occur, the marginal revenue from product disposal in the low-
demand state evaluated at kd is lower than the marginal cost in product disposal cs − cd.
It is easy to verify that this condition is the complement set of (16): cd+ c ≤ µ/(1− b) (see
the Appendix). Likewise, for capacity expansion not to occur, the marginal revenue from
capacity expansion evaluated at kd needs to be lower than the marginal cost in capacity
expansion cs + ce. This no-expansion condition is derived as ce − c > cd + c, which is the
same as in the monopoly case.
The disposal intensity in duopoly is given by
DId = 1−
qdL
kd
, (19)
where qdL and kd are given by (17) and (18), respectively. Although the explicit form
of DId is more involved than the counterpart in monopoly, it is easy to verify that the
characteristics in Proposition 3 holds.
More interesting (and complicated) question is whether market competition may con-
tribute to decreasing disposal intensity (product disposal per output). First, when b = 0,
the two products are independent so that each firm behaves as a monopolist. This can
be seen by setting b = 0 in (17) and (18), leading to the monopolistic solutions (see the
DN case in Table 1). Next consider b > 0. Although it is difficult to evaluate the sign of
∂DIm/∂b without any restrictions on b, around b = 0, we can obtain
∂DIm
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= aL(2c + cs + cd)− aH(cs − cd).
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Thus, if the unit sales cost is lower than the unit disposal cost, the sign is unambiguously
positive, which means that price competition in a differentiated duopoly increases disposal
intensity relative to monopoly. Suppose that the unit sales cost is large enough to let cs−cd
be positive. The duopoly disposal intensity is lower than the monopoly disposal intensity if
aH
aL
>
2c+ cs + cd
cs − cd
holds. The left-hand side, the ratio of market size in the two demand states, is interpreted
as variability of demand.9 The right-hand side is the ratio of the long-run (first-stage) unit
cost of capacity building to the short-run (second-stage) unit sales cost, which increases
as the first stage unit production cost c or the unit disposal cost cd increases. Therefore,
else equal, duopolistic competition tends to reduce disposal intensity with high demand
variability and higher long-run disposal costs (cd + c). These results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 8. Duopolistic competition in differentiated goods does not always reduce dis-
posal intensity (product disposal per output) from the monopoly benchmark. If the unit sales
cost is lower than the unit disposal cost, the disposal intensity in duopoly is higher than in
the monopoly. Otherwise, duopolistic competition lowers disposal intensity if demand vari-
ability is sufficiently high relative to the ratio of the long-run capacity building cost to the
short-run sales cost.
In summary, I conclude that duopolistic competition reduces the likelihood of firms’
choice of the status quo strategy. Either capacity expansion or product disposal is more
likely to occur and this tendency is enhanced as the products become better substitutes
(Proposition 7). The welfare effect is obviously positive because firms adjust first-stage
sales capacities more flexibly, in addition to standard welfare gains from becoming less
monopolistic. Product disposal becomes more frequent. However, with demand uncertainty,
product disposal itself is not irrational. Furthermore, duopolistic competition leads to either
higher or lower disposal intensities depending on the relative size of demand variability to
production costs. Although difficult to obtain clearcut conclusions, it is fair to say that
when product demand is highly variable, duopolistic competition contributes to lowering
disposal intensity, relative to benchmark monopoly (Proposition 8).
9It is easy to verify that aH/aL increases as µ increases.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the effect of competition among firms on their decisions about
the pre-committed production (sales capacities), sales quantities, and product disposal in
imperfect competition. To obtain benchmark results, the analysis begins with a monopoly
case. Using the benchmark, I describe a complete set of parameter configurations with which
one of the following three cases emerges: (i) neither capacity expansion nor product disposal
occurring regardless of demand realization; (ii) only capacity expansion occurring when high
demand is realized; and (iii) only product disposal occurring when low demand is realized.
The present paper finds that the flexibility in capacity constraints, such as responding to
high demand by spot production, substantially reduces the likelihood of product disposal.
In addition, the paper confirms that disposal intensity chosen by a monopolist is socially
optimal, which implies that even the social planner who maximizes the expected social
welfare before demand uncertainty is resolved, cannot reduce product disposal.
With these benchmark results, the paper examines the effects of duopolistic competition
in differentiated goods on product disposal. Main findings are as follows. First, duopolistic
competition increases the likelihood that either capacity expansion or product disposal
occurs. This tendency is enhanced as the two goods are better substitutable. In this
sense, competitive markets observe product disposal more frequently. Second, duopolistic
competition leads to either higher or lower disposal intensities depending on the relative
size of demand variability to production costs.
There are issues requiring further investigation. First, the present model features
oligopolistic competition in differentiated goods, which eliminates the possibility of mixed-
strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, analytical solutions are somewhat complex which reduces
the model’s tractability. The assumption of linear demand is hopefully relaxed to check the
robustness of the obtained results. All these are left for future work.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 2
∂DI
∂a¯
< 0 and ∂DI
∂cs
> 0 are immediate. Since the sales quantity is positive,
qL > 0 ⇔ a¯ > µ+ cs − cd (A.1)
holds, which proves
∂DI
∂c
= − [a¯+ µ− (2c+ cd + cs)] + 2µ− 2(c+ cd) = −(a¯− µ+ cd − cs) < 0.
To obtain ∂DI
∂µ
> 0 and ∂DI
∂cd
< 0, subtracting c+ cs from the both sides of (A.1) yileds
a¯− (c+ cs) > µ− (cd + c) > 0
which proves
∂DI
∂µ
= a¯+ µ− (2c + cd + cs)− [µ− (c+ cd)] = a¯− (c+ cs) > 0,
∂DI
∂cd
= − [a¯+ µ− (2c+ cd + cs)] + µ− (c+ cd) = −a¯+ c+ cs < 0.
A.2 Proposition 4
Since ∂kd/∂µ = 1/2 and ∂qdL/∂µ = −1/2,
∂p¯id
∂µ
= 2kd
∂kd
∂µ
+ 2qdL
∂qdL
∂µ
= kd − qdL > 0.
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A.3 Proposition 5
The average social welfare is defined by the sum of the average profits and the average
consumer surplus. In the DN case, the average social welfare is
W¯d = p¯id +
1
2
[
k2d + q
2
dL
2
]
=
3
4
[
k2d + q
2
dL
2
]
.
Thus, from Proposition 4, we can immediately conclude that ∂W¯d/∂µ > 0.
A.4 Corollary 1
How about a disposal tax? The government chooses td to maximize the following (average)
social welfare:
W¯d(td) = p¯id(td) +
1
2
[
k2d(td) + q
2
dL(td)
2
]
+
1
2
td [kd(td)− qdL(td)]
=
3
4
[
kd(td)
2 + qdL(td)
2
]
+
1
2
td [kd(td)− qdL(td)]
Noting that ∂kd/∂td = −1/2 and ∂qdL/∂td = 1/2, the derivative of W¯d with respect to
td is given by
∂W¯d(td)
∂td
=
3
2
[
kd
∂kd
∂td
+ qdL
∂qdL
∂td
]
+
1
2
[kd − qdL] +
1
2
td
[
∂kd
∂td
−
∂qdL
∂td
]
=
3
4
[−kd + qdL] +
1
2
[kd − qdL]−
1
2
td =
qdL − kd
4
−
1
2
td.
Since d = kd − qdL > 0, we have
∂W¯d(td)
∂td
∣∣∣∣
td=0
< 0
B Technical Note
B.1 Cournot Competition in Differentiated Goods
Suppose that direct demand function for firm i is given by
qi = a− b1pi + b2pj, (B.1)
where pj it the price of rival firm’s good. The corresponding inverse demand is
pi = α− β1qi − β2qj,
where α = a/(b1 − b2), β1 = b1/(b
2
1 − b
2
2), and β2 = b2/(b
2
1 − b
2
2).
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In Cournot competition, firms compete in quantities. Firm i choose qi to maximize
(α − β1qi − β2qj)qi − xqi, taking as given qj. The Cournot reaction function of firm i to
output qj is (α− x− β2qj)/2β1. By symmetry, the Cournot equilibrium is
qc =
α− x
2β1 + β2
, pc =
β1α+ (β1 + β2)x
2β1 + β2
.
However, for deriving firm i’s reaction function, it is convenient to consider profit-
maximizing firm i that chooses pi with maintaining the rival firm’s quantity qj constant.
Note that such choice of pi necessarily affects pj (the demand for firm j which is analogous
to (B.1) and
∂pj
∂pi
=
b2
b1
.
Given the marginal production cost x, firm i’s profit-maximization with respect to pi
(instead of qi) yields firm i’s reaction function in price space. Noting that ∂qi/∂pi =
−b1 + b2∂p2/∂p1 = −b1 + b
2
2/b1, the first-order condition is given by
qi + pi
∂qi
∂pi
= x
∂qi
∂pi
⇔a− b1pi + b2pj +
b22 − b
2
1
b1
pi =
b22 − b
2
1
b1
x
⇔ab1 + b1b2pj + (b
2
2 − 2b
2
1)pi = (b
2
2 − b
2
1)x
⇔pci =
1
2b21 − b
2
2
[
ab1 + b1b2p
c
j + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x
]
. (B.2)
The slope of this reaction function is
∂pj
∂pi
= (2b21 − b
2
2)/b1b2 is greater than 1 since b1 > b2
is assumed.
Due to the symmetric structure of the model, we can analogously derive firm j’s reaction
function. In equilibrium, pi = pj, substituting this into (B.3), we obtain
pci = p
c
j =
ab1 + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x
(b1 − b2)(2b1 + b2)
, qci = q
c
j =
(b1 + b2) [a− (b1 − b2)x]
2b1 + b2
.
In Bertrand competition, ∂qi/∂pi = −b1. Thus, firm i’s reaction function is derived by
qi + pi
∂qi
∂pi
−
∂qi
∂pi
x = 0
⇔a− b1pi + b2pj − b1pi + b1x = 0
⇔pbi =
a+ b1x+ b2p
b
j
2b1
. (B.3)
As is standard, the slope of this reaction function is greater than 1 in a (pi, pj) plane since
b1 > b2 is assumed. It is straightforward to check the slope of the Bertrand-reaction function
is steeper than that of the Cournot-reaction function.
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By symmetry, the price and sales quantity in the Bertrand equilibrium is as follows:
pbi = p
b
j =
a+ b1x
2b1 − b2
, qbj = q
b
j =
b1 [a− (b1 − b2)x]
2b1 − b2
. (B.4)
It is straightforward to check pbi < p
c
i since
ab1 + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x
2b21 − b
2
2 − b1b2
>
a+ b1x
2b1 − b2
⇔[ab1 + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x][2b1 − b2]− [a+ b1x][2b
2
1 − b
2
2 − b1b2] > 0
⇔2ab21 − ab1b2 + (2b1 − b2)(b
2
1 − b
2
2)x− 2ab
2
1 + ab
2
2 + ab1b2 − b1[2b
2
1 − b
2
2 − b1b2]x > 0
⇔(2b31 − 2b1b
2
2 − b
2
1b2 + b
3
2)x+ ab
2
2 − (2b
3
1 − b1b
2
2 − b
2
1b2)x > 0
⇔b22 [a− (b1 − b2)x] > 0,
so that the more differentiated the goods are (b2 ↓), the smaller is the difference between
the Cournot and Bertrand prices, and in the extreme sitution of independent goods (b2 = 0)
the difference is zero. The type of competition becomes less important, the less related the
goods are.
Consider first profits in Cournot competition:
pici = (p
c
i − x)q
c
i
=
[
ab1 + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x
2b21 − b
2
2 − b1b2
− x
]
qci
=
[
ab1 + (b
2
1 − b
2
2)x− (2b
2
1 − b
2
2 − b1b2)x
2b21 − b
2
2 − b1b2
]
qci
= b1
[
a− (b1 − b2)x
2b21 − b
2
2 − b1b2
]
qci = b1(b
2
1 − b
2
2)
[
a− (b1 − b2)x
2b21 − b
2
2 − b1b2
]2
=
b1
b21 − b
2
2
(qci )
2
Then, profits in Bertrand competition is
pibi = (p
b
i − x)q
b
i
=
[
a+ b1x
2b1 − b2
− x
]
qbi
=
[
a− (b1 − b2)x
2b1 − b2
]
qbi = b1
[
a− (b1 − b2)x
2b1 − b2
]2
=
(qbi )
2
b1
Since the goods are substitutes (β2 > 0), low prices mean low profits, and Cournot profits
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are larger than Bertrand profits: pic > pib.
b1
b21 − b
2
2
(qci )
2 >
(qbi )
2
b1
⇔
b21
(b1 + b2)(b1 − b2)
>
[
b1(2b1 + b2)
(b1 + b2)(2b1 − b2)
]2
⇔
b1 + b2
b1 − b2
>
[
2b1 + b2
2b1 − b2
]2
⇔2b32 > 0,
which is true as long as b2 > 0.
B.2 The second-stage subgames
Consider the case of x = cs−cd first. When firm i reacts to firm j’s price with the Bertrand
prices, firm i’s profits is expressed by a function of pj as follows:
pibi (pj |ki) = [r
b
i (pj |ki)− x]qi − cdki
=
(
a+ bpj + x
2
− x
)(
a+ bpj −
a+ bpj + x
2
)
− cdki =
1
4
(a− x+ bpj)
2 − cdki,
which is a quadratic function of pj and monotonically increasing in the domain of pj > 0.
When firm i reacts to firm j’s price with the status quo prices, firm i’s profits is expressed
by a function of pj as follows:
pici (pj |ki) = [Φi(pj |ki)− cs] ki = (a− ki − cs + bpj)ki,
which is a linear function of pj with the slope bki.
I claim that pib − pic ≥ 0 for all pj . To see this,
1
4
[a− (cs − cd) + bpj]
2 − cdki − (a− ki − cs + bpj)ki
=
1
4
[a− (cs − cd) + bpj]
2 − [a− (cs − cd) + bpj]ki + k
2
i
=
[
a− (cs − cd) + bpj
2
− ki
]2
≥ 0,
which reveals that pic is a tangent of pib and the tangent point is given by
(pj , pi) =
(
2ki − a+ (cs − cd)
b
, ki + cs − cd
)
.
At the tangent point, firm i’s capacity is entirely sold. Thus, for pj > [2ki−a+(cs− cd)]/b,
firm i cannot have products for disposal, which restricts the rival price range where firm i
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optimally disposes of its product such that pj < [2ki−a+(cs− cd)]/b, which coincides with
pj(1) in Figure 2.
For the case of x = cs + ce, pi
b − pic ≥ 0 can be analogously shown. Likewise, pic is a
tangent of pib in the case of x = cs + ce and the tangent point is given by
(pj , pi) =
(
2ki − a+ cs + ce
b
, ki + cs + ce
)
.
At the tangent point, firm i’s capacity is entirely sold. Thus, only for the range of pj >
[2ki − a+ cs + ce]/b, capacity expansion is relevant. This is pj(3) in Figure 2. In sum, firm
i’s reaction schedule in the second-stage subgame, Ri(pj|ki), is as follows:
Ri(pj |ki) =


rbi (pj |cs − cd) for pj <
2ki−a+(cs−cd)
b
Φi(pj |ki) for
2ki−a+(cs−cd)
b
≤ pj ≤
2ki−a+cs+ce
b
rbi (pj |cs + ce) for pj >
2ki−a+cs+ce
b
.
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